Rich,
I will answer this, your contention;
"My contention is that a small sliver of land in Southeast Asia, of limited strategic importance, limited natural resources, limited military importance, and limited wealth, was a poor place to dig in to make an ideological point. And, I believe, history bears that out. We retreated in 1975, and the strategic impact was...pretty much nothing. Because there was nothing in Vietnam to fight over, except ideology"
I and many other who are now critically examing all that happened in the light of history and a long view disagree.
Our principle involvement in Southeast Asia began in 1954 with the Geneva Accords, ending the French role. In 1954 SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Orgainzation) was created. (Australia, France, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United States were the member signatories. It lasted until 1975 and was formally dissolved in 1977.). It was a political, economic and military treaty in direct opposition to communist aggression in Southeast Asia. Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam was not signatories because they were designated as neutral countries, purportedly to be free from foreign domination. The first significant activity began in Laos where the communist backed Pathet Lao sought to gain control. In May of 1962 at the request of the Thai government about 5000 Marines were deployed to Thailand to counter Pathet Lao activity in southern Laos that directly threatened Thailand. Next was the American buildup in Vietnam itself. A military presence under the terms of the SEATO treaty but not directly sanctioned under SEATO command. Originally, troops from Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and Thailand were deployed at one time or another. By the way, the Austrailian presence continued on a limited scale up until 1972 when the last Australian Instructors left in December. Our active, on the ground, military opposition of communist forces in Southeast Asia over a period of 11 years (1962 to 1973) was an effective effort and had a major stategic impact on the free world.
We were making more than an ideological point in Vietnam. The domino theory was accurate. The ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand had the political will to resist and stayed free of Communism because of the U.S. commitment to Vietnam. The Indonesians threw the Soviets out in 1966 stating that it possible because of America's commitment in Vietnam. Without that commitment, Communism and Soviet influence and control would have swept all the way to the Malacca Straits, south of Singapore; an area that is of great strategic importance to the free world. Vietnam was at the northerneastern tip of this South Asian territory. So, yes Vietnam did have a very significant strategic role. And, we were holding the "moral high ground". Americans who deliberately killed civilians received prison sentences while Communists who did so received commendations. From 1957 to 1973, the National Liberation Front assassinated 36,725 South Vietnamese and abducted another 58,499. The death squads focused on leaders at the village level and on anyone who improved the lives of the peasants such as medical personnel, social workers, and schoolteachers.
Finally, you said; "We retreated in 1975, and the strategic impact was...pretty much nothing. Because there was nothing in Vietnam to fight over, except ideology." Well by 1975 the battle against communism in South Asia was over. No "war of national liberation" was left anywhere else in the region. However, the Vietnamese and Cambodian people were still there and there was a significant aftermath or fallout, as you will, maybe not strategically, but of grave importance to them and to me and some other people. In the two years after the fall of Saigon in 1975 (two years after the last US troop
